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8The Ethics of Unwinnable War
Dominic Tierney
INTRODUCTION
By 2004, the Iraq War had become unwinnable. Iraq had descended into 
sustained civil conflict, involving rival sectarian militias. A1 Qaeda in Iraq 
targeted US and Iraqi security forces, Shiites, and the United Nations. In April 
2004, the Abu Ghraib scandal revealed systematic American mistreatment 
of prisoners, eroding the legitimacy of the campaign. Given the worsening 
security conditions, there was no plausible path for Washington to create a 
stable Iraq at a sufficiently low cost to count as victory. The United States 
began a tortuous journey to extricate itself from a quagmire, involving the 
initial ‘leave-to-win’ policy that only worsened Iraq’s strife, the surge of US 
troops in 2007 that helped to create fragile stability, the exit of US soldiers in 
2011, and the invasion of Iraq by ISIS in 2014, which triggered the reinsertion 
of thousands of American ground personnel.
For the United States, the Iraq War was a traumatic experience, but unfor­
tunately, not an unusual one. The campaign is part of a string of unwinnable 
wars since World War II, including Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. When a 
military campaign deteriorates, officials face both profound strategic dilemmas 
and stark moral challenges. How can Washington resolve a failed war in an 
ethical manner? For example, the fall of South Vietnam to communism in 1975 
produced a wave of repression and a mass evacuation of‘boat people’ from the 
country. But to continue the war in Vietnam in an effort to save civilians would 
have risked further death and injury in a futile venture. Today, should the 
rights of Afghan women be sacrificed in a bid to reach a deal with the Taliban 
and end the fighting?
One of the most useful frameworks for answering these questions is just war 
theory, which establishes constraints and regulations on the initiation, pros­
ecution, and termination of war. Scholars in the just war tradition, however, 
usually consider scenarios where victory is still a plausible outcome and
neglect the issue of unwinnable war.^ This chapter considers how just war 
theory can be adapted when a campaign turns into a quagmire. Building on 
arguments in my book The Right Way to Lose a War (Tierney 2015), we focus 
on the US experience of conflict since 1945. We find that the justness of war is 
not static but can evolve over time. An unjust war for regime change may gain 
a new—and just—cause to protect civilians against a terrorist enemy. To 
maximize justice when a campaign is in retreat, leaders should typically pursue 
a middle path between ‘cut and run’ and ‘stay the course’, by limiting the war 
aims, resisting pressure to resort to barbarism, embracing negotiations with 
the adversary, and seeking the best possible peace from the range of plausible 
alternatives.
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JUST WAR THEORY
War refers to an armed contest between political communities to decide who 
gets to govern and how. Just war theory (JWT) is a tradition of military ethics 
designed to mitigate the brutality of war, which stretches back to the Sanskrit 
epic The Mahabharata. JWT is central to Catholic teaching on the morality of 
war, is widely taught in US and other military schools, has profoundly shaped 
international law (including the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, and the 
Geneva Conventions), and is often invoked to defend wars. For example, the 
Southern Baptist Convention (2003) claimed that ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was a warranted action based upon historic principles of just war’ (see also 
Orend 2013; Farrell 2013; Crawford 2003: 6).
JWT is usually divided into an ethical triptych.^ Jus ad helium establishes 
principles for when to fight wars.^ First, there must be a just cause to protect 
people’s rights: for example, defending against aggression or safeguarding 
innocent life, as opposed to using force for narrow self-aggrandizement. 
Second, a competent authority should initiate the war, defined as a political 
system that allows for just behaviour, which would exclude a brutal dictator­
ship. Third, there should be a high probability of success to avoid expending 
lives in a futile endeavour (for further discussion, see ‘The Probability of 
Success in Just War Theory’ in Chapter 9). Fourth, war should be a last resort 
when other avenues such as diplomacy have been exhausted. Fifth, the overall 
benefits of the war must be proportionate to the evil imposed, which is known
' For a very different take on the continuing relevance of the notion of victory in contem­
porary armed conflict, see Chapter 7 in this volume.
^ It should be noted, however, that Daniel Brunstetter (Chapter 13 in this volume) argues for 
an additional category of analysis, jus ad vim.
^ For a further discussion of how victory relates to jus ad bellum, see Patterson’s ‘War Aims, 
jus ad helium, and Victory’ in Chapter 7.
as macro-proportionality (Walzer 2015: ch. 4; Farrell 2013: 15-18; Murphy 
2014; Statman 2008).
Jus in hello establishes principles for rightful conduct in war once hostilities 
have begun. First, non-combatants are immune and prisoners of war must be 
treated humanely. Second, when selecting targets, the anticipated collateral 
damage in civilian lives should be proportionate to the military benefit, and 
due care must be taken to limit the risks of non-combatant suffering. Third, 
cruel and unusual weapons of war such as mass rape are inherently unjust 
(Farrell 2013: 18-19).
Jus post helium refers to creating a just post-war world, including the 
settlement of post-conflict issues, the ethical treatment of the defeated side, 
and the minimization of suffering for civilians. First, the victorious side should 
promptly end the war when the threatened rights have been vindicated, or the 
aggressor is prepared to negotiate terms of surrender with appropriate com­
pensation. Second, punishment must be employed in a discriminate fashion 
against guilty leaders rather than the mass population. Third, peace terms 
should be proportionate to the rights violated rather than being Carthaginian 
in scope. In other words, the aggressor state should be demilitarized and 
potentially rehabilitated, rather than destroyed. The fundamental goal is not 
to restore the pre-war status quo: a state of affairs which, after all, triggered the 
original conflict. Instead, the aim is a better peace than before (see ‘Victory 
and Just Peace in the Just War Tradition’ in Chapter 12), which enhances the 
security of rights, empowers local people, spreads democracy, and reduces the 
odds of future violence (Farrell 2013: 19; Orend 2013; Walzer 2004a: 166; 
Rigby 2005; Patterson 2012).
JWT does not offer a precise checklist. After all, how would we know if 
war was truly a last resort and every alternative option had been tried? And 
what probability of success is required: some possibility (say, 10 per cent) or 
better than even odds (say, 60 per cent)? Rather, JWT can be considered as a 
set of overarching principles that forces actors to make the case for an ethical 
campaign.
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UNWINNABLE WAR
As noted in the previous section, one of the key principle of jus ad helium is 
that victory is possible. However, for the United States, clear-cut success has 
become a rarity in contemporary conflict, whereas quagmires have become all 
too frequent. How does JWT apply to an unwinnable war, or a military 
campaign where decisive victory is no longer a plausible outcome? Victory 
means achieving the state’s goals with a favourable cost/benefit analysis. If the 
enemy’s resistance proves stronger than anticipated, allies jump ship, or
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domestic divisions occur, it may no longer be possible to attain the core 
objectives at a sufficiently low cost to count as a clear success.
Discussions of war sometimes fall into the trap of depicting the outcome of 
conflict in binary terms as a victory or defeat, like a sports match.^ But the 
outcome of war lies on a spectrum, and there is a wide range of possible 
results, including decisive success, partial success, a draw, partial failure, or 
decisive failure. As a result, there are many different kinds of unwinnable wars. 
In an extreme scenario, the only possible outcome is total defeat, for example, 
with the German war effort in 1945. But in other unwinnable wars there may 
be a wider range of potential results.
Here we focus on one particular kind of unwinnable war, a campaign of 
limited interests that turns into a quagmire, which I term a fiasco. Fiascos are 
not wars of national survival like World War II. Instead, they are expedition­
ary missions involving restricted national interests. If unexpected battlefield 
loss occurs, achieving the main goals of the campaign may cost too much 
blood and treasure and reap too small a benefit. Since the war only involves 
limited stakes, leaders cannot keep fighting indefinitely. Although victory is 
not achievable, many different outcomes may still be possible, from a partial 
success through to a debacle. In other words, there is potentially a great deal 
still to play for, both strategically and morally. The difference between a draw 
and a debacle may equate to the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians (for 
more on the fiasco concept, see Tierney 2015).
Since 1945, Washington has fought five major wars (defined as campaigns 
where the United States deployed over 50,000 troops and there were at least 
1000 battle deaths on all sides): Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. Four of those wars—Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan— 
became fiascos. Only in the Gulf War did victory remain on the table. After 
World War II, the nature of war evolved from inter-state war to civil war and 
the US military struggled to adapt to the new environment of counter­
insurgency (Tierney 2015: ch. 1).
In June 1950, communist North Korea invaded non-communist South 
Korea, and the United States organized an international coalition to aid 
Seoul under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. US-led forces 
pushed the North Koreans out of the South, crossed the 38th parallel into 
North Korea, and advanced towards the Chinese border. In October 1950, 
China intervened, triggering a major US battlefield defeat and forcing American 
and allied troops south of the 38th parallel. By the end of 1950, the war was 
unwinnable. Decisive success, or the overthrow of the North Korean regime at a 
reasonable cost, was an implausible outcome. As MacArthur put it, we face an 
entirely new war’ (Stueck 2002: 93).
■* The biblical presentation of victory is indicative of this approach; see ‘New Directions’ in 
Chapter 2, this volume.
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A decade later, the United States suffered another fiasco in Vietnam. By 
1966, decisive victory, or the creation of a secure and independent South 
Vietnam, could not be achieved at a reasonable cost. The United States was 
unable to suppress the South Vietnamese insurgents (known as the Viet Cong 
or the National Liberation Front), or force North Vietnamese troops to leave 
the South. The Communists displayed extraordinary commitment, whereas 
America’s ally. South Vietnam, lacked legitimacy or a popular base of support 
(Boot 2013: 420; Berman 1989: 13-22).
More recently, the US War on Terror triggered two fiascos. In 2001, the 
United States overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at remarkably low 
cost. But Washington demonstrated only a modest commitment to build a 
new Afghan state, and the Taliban recovered in southern Afghanistan as well 
as in sanctuaries in Pakistan. By 2006, the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable. 
There was no credible path to defeat the insurgents at a reasonable cost. By this 
point, the Taliban controlled significant territory in the south, and from 2005 
to 2006, Taliban armed attacks tripled from 1500 to 4500 (Jones 2010; Tomsen 
2011; Malkasian 2013). Meanwhile, the United States endured a further fiasco 
in Iraq. By 2004, the Iraq War was unwinnable as the prospect of stabilizing 
the country receded into the distance. The insurgency had metastasized with 
multiple Sunni and Shiite rebel groups. In 2003, there were 486 US military 
fatalities. In 2004, this figme almost doubled to 849.^
How can leaders fight an unwinnable war in a just manner? JWT has tended 
to neglect this question. Scholars often assmne that decisive victory remains a 
viable option on the table. In other words, leaders are told to select a war they 
can win, achieve victory without resorting to barbarism, and then impose a 
just settlement on the defeated party. As Walzer (2015:110) says, ‘A just war is 
one that is morally urgent to win.’ The inattention to unwinnable war is 
surprising given America’s recent history of quagmires, as well as the crucial 
role of the Vietnam War in triggering renewed interest in JWT (Walzer 2015: 
335). This neglect may result from JWT’s lack of focus on jus post helium 
(which is particularly relevant in unwinnable wars) compared to jus ad helium 
and jus in hello, as well as the wider absence of scholarship in international 
relations on issues of unwinnable war and conflict termination (Walzer 2015; 
Orend 2001; Patterson 2012; Tierney 2015).
The inattention to unwinnable war is problematic because theorists have 
focused on a scenario of winnable war that—for the United States at least—has 
recently been the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, unwinnable 
wars raise significant ethical issues. Fighting a just war is problematic even 
when a military campaign is proceeding smoothly. But now the nation is 
reeling from battlefield loss and the war effort is unravelling. By definition, an
^ See <http://icasualties.org>; <http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/saban/iraq-index>.
unwinnable campaign has already violated a key tenet of just war theory: a 
reasonable chance of success. Furthermore, although the original goals may 
once have represented a just cause, these aims cannot be fully achieved at an 
acceptable cost. The United States may be at fault for the deteriorating 
campaign, for example, due to overconfidence and poor planning, and there­
fore could accrue a particular moral responsibility to limit the damage to 
civilians. At the same time, the worsening campaign means that the United 
States has a reduced capacity to shape outcomes. In other words, Washington 
has more responsibility and less influence.
How can officials end a failing war in a just manner? Which values must be 
sacrificed in a bid to end the war? Does Washington have an obligation to fix 
what it destroyed and save its friends? Or should officials be willing to 
abandon their allies in a bid to end a deteriorating venture?
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THE JUST WAY TO LOSE
If victory is an unrealistic goal, leaders must choose a viable exit strategy to 
cut the nation’s losses, safeguard its interests, and protect the rights of 
soldiers and civilians. A fiasco is not an excuse to abandon the pursuit of 
justice. The danger is not the kind of existential threat that might necessitate 
survival at any price. And a range of outcomes may still be attainable, with 
significant variation in the degree of justice. At the same time, the exit 
strategy will almost certainly involve some compromise or outright sacrifice 
of moral principle. Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus (2011) draw a useful 
analogy between ethical goals in war and mountain rescue operations. There 
is a moral purpose to save a stranded climber. But this obligation must be 
balanced by responsibilities to the rescue party. What if the rescue mission 
risks further loss? An unwinnable war is like a mountain rescue mission in 
the midst of a mighty tempest. The rescuers need a cool-headed analysis of 
what can reasonably be achieved.
After a war becomes unwinnable, several JWT principles may be moot. 
For example, by this point in time, the question of whether or not the 
initiation of hostilities was a first resort or a last resort is settled. But most 
JWT principles remain in play, including jus ad bellum notions of fighting 
for a just cause, choosing achievable goals, and ensuring that the overall 
benefits of the war outweigh the costs; jus in bellum notions of protecting the 
immunity of civilians and prisoners; and jus post bellum notions of creating 
an ethical settlement. The solution is to follow a multistep process: redefin­
ing war aims, negotiating an acceptable peace, and avoiding the embrace of 
barbarism.
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REDEFINE WAR AIMS
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The key to extricating a country from an unwinnable conflict in a just manner 
is to redefine the goals of the war. Here, goals refer to political aims, or who 
rules a given territory and in what ways. According to Carl von Clausewitz 
(1989: 87), war is not about destruction as an end in itself, but is instead, a 
‘political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with 
other means’ (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of Clausewitz). A fiasco implies 
that the original objectives are unattainable at an acceptable price in blood and 
treasure and must be rethought. There will be no triumphant peace. There will 
be no surrender ceremony. There will be no war termination based on 
occupying and rehabilitating a prostrate adversary.
The JWT principle that victory must be achievable might imply that an 
unwinnable war is inherently unjust and should be concluded immediately. 
But in a fiasco, cutting and running is rarely an ethical choice. There is a 
difference between a potential conflict and a war that has already begun. In 
peacetime, there is a moral presumption against initiating war, and the 
belligerent has the burden of demonstrating that just war conditions have 
been satisfied. But there is no moral presumption to quit an ongoing cam­
paign. Precipitously ending a military operation may produce severe strategic 
and ethical costs, including the collapse of the war effort and a humanitarian 
crisis. Having caused (at least in part) negative consequences for other people, 
leaders incur a responsibility to mitigate the damage. Indeed, even if the war 
has thus far caused harm to civilians beyond what would have been considered 
proportionate at the start, it should not necessarily be terminated. Excessive past 
civilian deaths are to a large extent a sunk cost: the key is to assess probable 
future harm (McMahan 2015).
Most recent US fiascos involve nation building and counter-insurgency 
in the midst of a civil war. Walzer (2015: ch. 6) is sceptical about the justice 
of intervention in a foreign internal conflict except to help a political 
community achieve liberation, balance intervention by another state, or 
prevent gross violations of human rights. Although it may often be unjust 
to wade into a civil war, it does not follow that once a country is engaged 
in a nation-building mission, and the operation begins to unravel, it should 
be abandoned. Even if the project of reshaping political and social institu­
tions was originally unjust, aborting it in mid-stream could produce the 
worst of all worlds: societal collapse. Instead, there is a responsibility to 
pursue what Walzer (2004a: 166) calls a ‘just occupation’ involving self- 
sacrifice rather than profiteering, and an effort to protect individual rights. 
According to the so-called ‘Pottery Barn’ rule, ‘you break it, you own it’ 
(Walzer 2002: 940; see Chapter 10 in this volume for a discussion of victory 
in hybrid warfare).
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Although leaders should not abandon the campaign, they ought to select a 
narrower set of goals. A fiasco implies that the country lacks the military 
capability to achieve its original aims. Reducing the ambition of the objectives 
is strategically necessary to align the ends and means of war. Dialling down the 
war aims is also consistent with JWT. Since the futile pursuit of a cause is 
unjust, the war aims must be consistent with strategic possibility. In addition, 
the principle of macro-proportionality states that the overall benefits of the 
war must outweigh the evil imposed. Battlefield reversals suggest that this cost/ 
benefit analysis has altered. Only by selecting a revised set of goals can the 
costs and benefits be appropriately balanced.®
Walzer (2015) argued that just war involves limited goals since internation­
al order rests on norms of accommodation and restraint. Maximal goals of 
conquest and the political reconstruction of the adversary can be justified only 
in extreme scenarios like World War II. The case for limited goals is strength­
ened when a state endures battlefield loss and victory becomes implausible. If 
just wars are conservative, unwinnable just wars are very conservative.
How should the war aims be re-evaluated? Leaders must carefully assess 
the strategic stakes, including the probable costs and benefits of pursuing 
each objective, the potential for allied support and public backing, possible 
negative contingencies, and the likely sustainability of gains over the longer 
term. What about the ethical dimension? When victory is still attainable, the 
goal of a just war is a better peace than the status quo ante helium, or a greater 
protection of rights than before, and the removal of factors that originally 
caused the war. In an unwinnable war, however, a better peace than before 
may not be realistic. Instead, the aim is the best peace possible from the range 
of plausible alternatives.
The ambition of the war aims will depend in part on the underlying justice 
of the mission. If the campaign began in accordance with just war principles— 
as a last resort, in self-defence, for a compelling moral purpose—then rela­
tively more expansive goals can be justified even if a decisive victory is 
implausible. As the fundamentals of the war deviate from just war principles, 
appropriate war aims will tend to be more modest.
It is notable that the justice of the war aims may evolve during a military 
operation. For example, a state may initiate a regime change mission without 
satisfying the just war conditions for jus ad helium. If the enemy regime is 
toppled and the target country then destabilizes, however, the task of provid­
ing security and representative government to the population may be con­
sidered just. The overall war is not retrospectively rehabilitated. But the 
original murky ethics of the invasion do not invalidate the new moral purpose; 
indeed, they may imply additional responsibility for cleaning up the mess
® This argument, which overlaps with that of Brunstetter (Chapter 13), runs contrary to that 
made by Patterson (‘The Scandal of Winning’ in Chapter 7), both in this volume.
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(Walzer 2004b). Furthermore, there must also be a kind of moral triage. Given 
battlefield reversals, leaders will need to prioritize certain ethical goals over 
others: for example, the prevention of mass killing or genocide. Leaders must 
also ensure that moral gains are sustainable: saving lives in the immediate term 
should not risk chaos in the longer term.
Here, we can briefly consider the justice of US war aims in Korea, Vietnam, 
and Iraq. These cases reveal that an exit strategy can be unjust for a variety of 
reasons, including because the belligerent tries to leave too slowly or too 
quickly. When the Korean War became unwinnable in late 1950, following 
Chinese intervention, Truman chose to reduce the war aims, which was both 
strategically and morally justifiable. MacArthur urged Washington to widen 
the objectives and take the war to China, which could have risked the outbreak 
of World War III. Instead, the United States and its key allies abandoned the 
goal of regime change in North Korea, and embraced the more modest 
objective of negotiating a return to essentially the pre-war status quo. This 
aim safeguarded the core moral basis for the war effort: defending South Korea 
fi'om aggression. The reassessment of war aims was critical in ending the 
campaign without costly escalation or disastrous retreat (Stueck 1995: 136-7).
By contrast, Washington failed to adjust its objectives in Vietnam, further 
eroding the justice of the war effort. Even as the costs of war grew dramatically 
after 1965, Johnson maintained the maximal goal of an independent and non­
communist South Vietnam (Vandiver 1997). This expansive aim was an 
exercise in futility, failed the test of macro-proportionality by incurring dev­
astating costs with uncertain benefits, and, arguably, did not align with the 
wishes of the Vietnamese people.
Were Richard Nixon’s war aims just? From 1969-73, Nixon steadily with­
drew US troops and pursued negotiations with Hanoi to attain ‘peace with 
honor’ (Tierney 2015: ch. 2). In January 1973, the White House announced a 
deal to end US involvement in the war, which allowed the South Vietnamese 
regime of Nguyen Van Thieu to remain in office. But Nixon’s policy also failed 
the test of macro-proportionality. To pressure Hanoi, Nixon expanded the war 
by invading Laos and Cambodia, dramatically stepped up the bombing of 
North Vietnam, and mined the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. In the 
end, an additional 20,000 Americans were killed during the Nbcon presidency, 
together with around 500,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, and 
hundreds of thousands of civilians. ‘Peace with honor’ was an illusion because 
Hanoi’s military victory was almost inevitable. If Saigon could not repress the 
insurgency or defeat North Vietnamese forces with the aid of 500,000 American 
troops, how could it expect to do so after US soldiers left? National Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger sought a ‘decent interval’ between US troops leaving 
and the final collapse in the South (Hughes 2010: 501; Rose 2010: 191-3; 
Kimball 2001). A decent interval to mask defeat is an insufficient moral basis 
to continue a highly destructive war. Indeed, the terms that Washington
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gained in 1973 could have been achieved in 1968 or even 1965 (Kaiser 2000: 
427; Logevall 2001: 2).
In Iraq, the US war aims were also unjust, but for a different reason: 
too little commitment. Walzer wrote (2004a: 164): ‘having fought the war, 
we are now responsible for the well-being of the Iraqi people.’ But after Iraq 
became a fiasco in 2004, Washington pursued a policy of ‘leave-to-win’ 
based on withdrawing as soon as possible. The Bush administration was 
fiercely opposed to the idea of prolonged nation building in Iraq. Instead, 
the White House sought to hand over sovereignty to Iraqi exiles and other 
supporters, hastily train Iraqi security forces, let Baghdad take the lead in 
providing security, and reduce US troop levels from 130,000 to 100,000 by 
the end of 2006 (Dodge 2012: 246-50; Ricks 2009: 52). The predictable result 
was further chaos. For example, Baghdad could not provide security because 
government forces often doubled as death squads. In 2005-6, Iraqi civilian 
deaths increased from 20,000 to 35,000/
In summary, Truman’s revised goals in Korea were just, whereas the 
objectives in Vietnam and Iraq were unjust. In part, this reflected the fact 
that Korea was the only war among these three campaigns that was originally 
fought for a just cause—the defence of South Korea from external aggression— 
which provided a moral anchor for the mission. Vietnam did not have a just 
cause because of the implausibility of success and the questionable correlation 
of US goals with the popular will of the local people. Meanwhile, the invasion 
of Iraq was also unjust because the campaign was far from a last resort, 
represented a preventive war against a distant threat, and faced uncertain 
odds of success.
What distinguished Vietnam and Iraq? First of all, the cause in Vietnam was 
never just because of widespread popular support for the insurgents. In Iraq, 
however, there was greater local backing for a representative regime, and 
therefore, the goal of providing stability to the country can be considered 
just. The second difference is the battlefield reality. The strength of North 
Vietnam and the Viet Cong, and the weakness of Saigon, meant that the 
United States should have moved more quickly to negotiate a deal based on a 
unified and neutralized Vietnam. In Iraq, however, the insurgency lacked the 
capabilities or the legitimacy of the Viet Cong. Even if decisive victory was not 
attainable in Iraq, the goal of improving security through a greater commit­
ment of capabilities was realistic. The invasion of Iraq may have been unjust 
but the solution of ‘leave-to-win’ simply compounded the moral error.
Having established revised goals, the United States will typically need to 
surge its forces, or send temporary reinforcements as part of an ultimate exit 
strategy. Given the deteriorating strategic conditions, a surge may be necessary
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to avoid a sudden collapse of the war effort. Furthermore, battlefield failure 
implies a mismatch between the objectives of the campaign and US capabil­
ities in the field. Dialling down the aims and strengthening capabilities can 
bring the ends and means into alignment. In 2007, for example, the United 
States ordered a surge of forces in Iraq, which contributed to a stark fall in 
violence (Ucko 2009: ch. 6). And there is also an ethical case for a surge. 
Murphy (2014: 152) wrote that there is a moral obligation ‘to take advantage 
of everything that would make victory more likely. It would not be morally 
acceptable to content oneself with a 75 percent chance of winning if one knew 
that certain strategies would raise that to a 95 percent chance and those 
strategies were to hand.’
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THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATING
An unwinnable war will likely require a shift to a negotiated compromise 
peace. Indeed, every US fiasco since 1945—Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan—involved extensive bargaining with the enemy. American cul­
ture is often sceptical about negotiating with evil adversaries, in part due to 
the moralism of US society. George W. Bush (2005) claimed that America’s 
enemies ‘will not be stopped by negotiation, or concessions, or appeals to 
reason. In this war, there is only one option—and that is victory.’ Wartime 
negotiations are inherently ethically challenging. There may be profound 
differences in moral values, for example, between US ideals of individual 
freedom and North Vietnamese communism or the Taliban’s vision of an 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The enemy may have committed serious 
human rights violations or abrogated the most basic diplomatic norms. In 
2011, for example, the Taliban sent an envoy to meet the chair of the Afghan 
High Peace Council. The envoy embraced the chair, and thereupon detonated 
a bomb hidden in his turban, killing them both (Bew et al. 2013). In certain 
cases, where the adversary is truly extreme and intransigent, such as ISIS, there 
may be little potential for peace talks.
But once a war becomes unwinnable, justice typically requires a negotiated 
end to the fighting. How else will the United States achieve long-term peace 
and the protection of national interests and human rights? There is a danger of 
snubbing negotiations on ethical grounds and then ultimately incurring even 
greater moral injury. In 2003, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, received a memo proposing that the United States reach out to 
Sunni insurgents. Wolfowitz rejected the idea and scribbled three words in 
the margin: ‘They are Nazis!’ (Perry 2010: 10). As a result, Iraq spiralled 
downward into disorder and sectarian warfare.
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Diplomacy has proved effective in unwinnable wars. In 2006-7, the US 
negotiated an alliance with Sunni tribal leaders in Iraq, and signed up tens of 
thousands of Sunnis for the Awakening Councils and the ‘Sons of Iraq’ 
programme, which helped pull Iraq back from the brink (Biddle et al. 2012). 
The American diplomat Richard Holbrooke did not regret bargaining with 
immoral people. ‘If you can prevent the deaths of people still alive, you’re not 
doing a disservice to those already killed by trying to do so’ (Lee 2010).
What about war crimes trials? Many just war theorists see trials or tribunals 
as morally indispensable. For example, Walzer wrote (2015:287; see also Orend, 
2013; 193-5) that people can ‘rightly demand an accounting’ from leaders, who 
may be ‘criminally responsible’ for aggression. But in an unwinnable war, there 
is less scope for war crimes trials. Battlefield loss means the adversary cannot be 
forced to appear before a tribunal. In Afghanistan today, for example, insisting 
on war crimes trials could make a peace deal with the Taliban impossible 
(Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003/4). However, there remains scope for targeting 
abuses on one’s own side: for example, Washington pimished the American 
guards at Abu Ghraib with prison terms and hard labour.
THE PROBLEM OF BARBARISM
The principles of jus in bello are designed to restrain the barbarism of war, 
notably by drawing a distinction between combatants and innocent civilians. 
A central debate in JWT concerns the tension between the standards of jus 
in bello and the military requirements to achieve victory (Walzer 2015: 48). In 
the case of unwinnable war, there is a tension between the standards of jus in 
bello and the military requirements to achieve a lesser loss versus a greater loss.
When exiting from a quagmire, can leaders embrace barbarism? If enemy 
resistance proves greater than expected, there is often pressure to remove 
restraints. For example, when a war is unwinnable, states may also seek to 
signal credibility and strength through destructive acts. In December 1972, 
Nixon launched the ‘Christmas bombing’ of Hanoi and Haiphong, causing 
widespread destruction of North Vietnamese infrastructure and, according to 
Hanoi, the deaths of 1600 civilians. The practical benefit of the bombing was 
minimal. In January 1973, the two sides signed an agreement that had been on 
the table since October. Instead, the bombing was mainly about optics: 
creating the impression of bombing the North into submission and demon­
strating US credibility even as it withdrew. The Christmas bombing is in­
defensible by just war standards because it extracted a grave price in civilian 
deaths for a dubious symbolic benefit.
Walzer (2015; 267) argued that restraints on war can be overridden in a 
‘supreme emergency’ where there is an imminent risk of great evil such as
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enslavement, and no obvious military alternatives—for example, with the 
British bombing of German cities in 1940. ‘Utilitarian calculation can force 
us to violate the rules of war only when we are face-to-face not merely with 
defeat but with a defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community.’ But 
fiascos rarely if ever represent a supreme emergency. When a US campaign in 
a country like Vietnam or Afghanistan unravels, the heavens are not about to 
fall on the American political community. Therefore, the core principle of 
proportionality should be protected.
Most recent American fiascos have been counter-insurgency operations, 
which provide particular challenges in terms oi jus in hello. For example, the 
insurgent enemy may hide among the people, complicating the distinction 
between combatant and non-combatant. Adversaries may deliberately seek 
to kill civilians in terrorist attacks. But even in asymmetric war, troops are 
expected to avoid targeting civilians. Indeed, there are powerful strategic 
reasons to reject barbarism in counter-insurgency campaigns. One of the 
basic principles of counter-insurgency or COIN is to outgovern the guer­
rillas and win ‘hearts and minds’ through the use of minimal force and the 
protection of the rule of law (US Army and Marine Corps 2007; Walzer 
2015: xiv).
One danger in an unwinnable war is that the attachment to a single moral 
principle can dominate a wider and more complex ethical calculus, blinding 
officials to the practical consequences of their actions. For example, a key 
notion of jus in hello is that prisoners of war acquire rights and should be 
considered immune from harm. Orend (2013: 192) wrote: ‘Obviously, a just 
peace settlement further requires that any and all prisoners-of-war... be 
returned safely to their home countries.’ In the Korean War, however, the 
protection of prisoner’s rights had perverse consequences.
By early 1952, after six months of truce negotiations, the peace terms had 
mostly been resolved, including the borders between North and South Korea. 
The only major issue left was the status of the POWs. China and North Korea 
demanded the traditional ‘all for all’ swap of POWs, which was consistent 
with the Geneva Conventions. But President Truman decided that captured 
communist prisoners should be allowed to defect. The motivations for this 
decision were complex. US officials were aware of the propaganda benefit 
if thousands of enemy prisoners chose to stay in the ‘free world’. But the 
main intention was humanitarian. Some of the prisoners were South Koreans 
who had been forcibly impressed into the communist military, and wanted 
to return to their homes in the South. There was also lingering guilt in 
Washington about the compulsory return of liberated Soviet POWs to Stalin 
in 1945, many of whom died in the gulags. In his diary, Truman suggested 
a strategy for US negotiators. ‘Read Confucius on morals to them. Read 
Buddha’s code to them. Read the Declaration of Independence to them. 
Read the French declaration. Liberty & Fraternity. Read the Bill of Rights to
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them. Read the 5th, 6th, & 7th Chapters of St. Matthew to them’ (Rose 2010: 
143; Stanley 2009; Foot 1990).
Was the insistence on voluntary repatriation a just poHcy? Walzer (2015: 
123) claimed that US negotiators were ‘probably right’ to uphold this principle 
in Korea—an example of appropriate ‘moral reasons for prolonging a war’. 
And in Walzer’s defence, 22,600 communist prisoners were able to defect. But 
Truman’s commitment to POW rights produced extraordinary costs. One 
problem lay in determining how many communist POWs actually wanted to 
defect. In the prison camps, anti-communist prisoners often ran the repatri­
ation screenings and violently coerced POWs into defecting (Rose 2010: 
147-8). As the number of supposed defectors swelled into the tens of thou­
sands, the communist countries saw the issue in terms of national prestige and 
refused to back down. In turn, Truman framed the policy as one of high moral 
principle. ‘To agree to forced repatriation would be unthinkable’, he told the 
American people; ‘We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings 
for slaughter or slavery’ (Stanley 2009: 158).
The issue of POW rights prolonged the war for fifteen months, during 
which time 100,000 allied troops were killed (including 9000 Americans), 3600 
American prisoners endured continued captivity, every major North Korean 
city was carpet-bombed, and hundreds of thousands of civilians died (Stueck 
2002: ch. 6). Finally, in the spring of 1953, after Stalin’s death, the communists 
conceded the principle of voluntary repatriation, and a neutral commission 
was created to process the prisoners.
The communists (and Stalin in particular) bore the greater share of moral 
responsibility both for the initiation of the war and its prolongation. Never­
theless, without thinking through the consequences, Truman fixated on a 
single principle of POW rights, with ultimate grave injury to soldiers and 
civilians. Less moralistic rhetoric and more prudent analysis of likely conse­
quences might have delivered a compromise that saved hundreds of thousands 
of lives.
The pursuit of justice does not end with a negotiated peace. Washington has 
a continued responsibility to diminish suffering. This means providing aid to 
refugees escaping from the warzone, and assistance for allies on the ground, 
like translators, who may risk death for helping the Americans. Adequate 
physical and mental health resources must be offered to veterans, who may 
have potentially served in a protracted counter-insurgency war with extended 
deployments and now lack the solace of victory. At the broader level, justice 
also requires a reckoning of the lessons of the military campaign. How can 
future debacles be averted? Americans must confront the tough lessons of war 
and take responsibility for failures, including war crimes. Fiascos are also an 
opportunity to adapt and reform. People and countries learn by failing, and 
the experience of loss can help cut through barriers to change. Over time, 
reconciliation with the adversary may also promote justice. Charles Kupchan
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(2010) described how reconciliation often begins with a peace offering, fol­
lowed by growing political, economic, and cultural contacts, and the creation 
of new and more positive narratives of the relationship. Indeed, many US allies 
were once adversaries, including Britain, Mexico, Spain, Italy, Germany, 
Japan, and possibly, in due course, Vietnam.
The Ethics of Unwinnable War
CONCLUSION
Extricating a country from a quagmire in a just manner may be the greatest 
challenge in politics. The stakes are high: a lesser loss versus a greater loss can 
represent life or death for thousands or millions. First of all, leaders should 
recognize that the outcome of war is not a binary, or victory versus defeat. 
Instead, officials facing an unwinnable conflict must traverse a grey zone 
between triumph and disaster, seeking a lesser loss versus a greater loss, or the 
best peace possible. This will often be ugly stability, or an imperfect order that 
protects core interests and values. Leaders should also note that the justice of a 
military campaign may be more fluid than is often thought. Wars that start with 
an unjust cause of regime change may later acquire a just cause to protect 
civilian rights from extremist groups. In response, leaders should typically 
reduce the ambition of the goals (without cutting and running), surge capabil­
ities, negotiate with the adversary, limit the role of war crimes trials, maintain 
restraints on barbarism, and avoid fixating on a single ethical principle.
Does the argument only apply to the United States? The extent of American 
interventionism during and after the Cold War means that the United States is 
particularly likely to end up in a fiasco, or an expeditionary campaign that 
becomes unwinnable. Certain challenges to a just exit strategy are also espe­
cially acute in Washington. For example, negotiating with immoral enemies in 
wartime tends to be more controversial in the United States than in other 
countries. But the basic framework also applies to other states. The French in 
Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan faced many of the same moral 
and strategic dilemmas as they sought to wind down failing wars.
Quagmires may also present an opportunity to rethink and develop JWT. 
It is notable that tough wars like Vietnam often trigger renewed scholarship 
in JWT (Orend 2013: 24). Difficult campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan may 
therefore produce fresh analysis of the ethics of fighting in an age of counter­
insurgency, terrorism, and drone strikes. The former CIA director John 
Brennan said that Barack Obama and himself shared similar views of just 
war theory. ‘The president requires near-certainty of no collateral damage. But 
if he believes it is necessary to act, he doesn’t hesitate’ (Goldberg 2016). By 
considering the justice of an unwinnable war, scholars can focus on a scenario, 
that, for the United States at least, appears to be the new normal.
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